The Domestic Cell Behind India's Solar Build-Out
Premier Energies Ltd
Understanding India's Solar Manufacturing Opportunity
Before any view on Premier, it is worth being clear about how a solar panel is actually made, and which step India cannot do enough of.
How a solar panel gets built
A solar panel is built in four steps. Polysilicon is purified silicon. It is cast into an ingot and sliced into wafers. Each wafer becomes a solar cell, the part that converts sunlight into electricity. Cells are then wired and sealed into a module, the panel seen on a roof or in a field.
The difficulty is not spread evenly. A module line is cheap and quick to build. A cell line needs clean rooms, expensive equipment and months of tuning before yields are commercial. Wafers are harder still. India has almost none of that upstream capacity and has historically bought it from China.
Read the chain left to right. The two upstream stages are almost entirely imported, the cell stage is short of what the panel stage needs, and only the panel stage has surplus. India can assemble roughly six times more panels than it has cells to put in them, and the difference is bought from abroad.
What changed in June 2026
- ALMM is a government approved list. Projects wanting government support must buy from manufacturers on it. Until recently it covered only modules, so a panel assembled in India from an imported cell qualified.
- ALMM List-II extended the requirement down to the cell and became binding on 1 June 2026. Most government-linked projects now need a panel built with an Indian-made cell. Net-metered and open-access projects have an exemption that runs only to the end of December 2026.
- Domestic content rules go further for certain programmes, and become mandatory for projects commissioned from 1 January 2027. Those orders arrive in the October to December 2026 window.
- Wafers are next. ALMM List-III for wafers takes effect from June 2028, extending the same requirement one stage further upstream.
The demand behind it
India added a record 44.6 GW in FY26, nearly double the year before, taking cumulative solar to 150 GW. Another 12 GW went in during Q1 FY27, and the 2030 target needs at least 37 GW every year from here. Demand is not the open question in this industry.
Even by FY28E, approved cell capacity reaches only about 85 GW against 205 GW of panel capacity. The shortage narrows but does not close, so the profit in this chain stays with whoever owns operating cell capacity.
The shortage is also protected. A 1 GW panel line used to cost about ₹150 crore, a panel-plus-cell line about ₹800 crore, and with the proposed wafer requirement roughly ₹1,100 crore. The cost of entry has risen about 7 times in three to four years, which is why new supply arrives slowly.
India does not have a shortage of solar panels. India has a shortage of domestic solar cells, at exactly the moment regulation is forcing demand towards domestic cells. Everything that follows in this report is about which company is placed to serve that.
Understanding Premier Energies
A Hyderabad manufacturer that has been making solar equipment for three decades, and has spent the last four years moving up the chain described above.
History and footprint
- Incorporated in 1995 as Premier Solar Systems, making it one of the older solar manufacturers in India rather than a recent entrant to the theme. It listed on the exchanges in September 2024.
- Three plants at Raviryala, in Rangareddy district near Hyderabad, housing the original module lines, the 3.6 GW cell line and a TOPCon module line.
- A 5.6 GW module plant at Seetharampur, Telangana, on 150 acres, inaugurated on 9 July 2026. This completed panel capacity at 11.1 GW.
- 269 acres at Naidupeta, Andhra Pradesh, holding the 7 GW cell plant now commissioning and the 10 GW ingot-wafer facility under construction.
What it manufactures
Premier makes both mono PERC bifacial cells, using M10 wafers in the 182mm format at around 23.5% efficiency, and the newer, higher-efficiency TOPCon cells that the industry is moving to. Its latest n-type TOPCon cell is listed on ALMM in the G12R format at an average efficiency of 25.37%, among the highest enlisted in India. On the panel side it produces monofacial and bifacial modules across a range of power outputs. Through subsidiaries it also provides engineering and construction services for solar farms, and has recently added transformers, residential inverters and aluminium frames.
| Capacity at year end | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panel capacity (GW) | 1.0 | 5.1 | 11.1 | 11.1 | 11.1 |
| Cell capacity (GW) | 0.8 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 10.6 | 10.6 |
| Ingot and wafer (GW) | – | – | – | – | 5.0 |
| Cell capacity as % of panels | 77% | 39% | 32% | 95% | 95% |
Read the bottom row. Premier grew panel capacity fast between FY24 and FY26 and the cell side did not keep pace, so it had to buy cells from outside. The FY27E column is where that reverses.
The base of the pyramid is where everyone competes: India has roughly 193 GW of approved panel capacity. One tier up there is about 30 GW of cell capacity, and one tier above that almost nothing. Premier is spending ₹6,700 crore of a ₹9,100 crore two-year programme on the top two tiers, where the competition is thinnest. That is the whole capital allocation story in one picture: the money is not going into more panels, it is going into the stages that panels depend on.
Who it sells to, and what is on the books
- Customers are large independent power producers, government programmes, commercial and industrial buyers, and engineering contractors in India and abroad. The revenue is not dependent on a single scheme or a single buyer.
- The order book stands at about ₹15,000 crore, of which ₹3,011 crore was won in Q1 FY27 alone. Roughly 40% to 45% is scheduled for delivery in FY28E, so a large part of next year's revenue is already contracted.
- The mix inside that book favours cells. Panels carrying the domestic-content label were about 24% of revenue in Q1 FY27, but make up roughly 58% of the order book. That portion is sold out, and the company is now taking orders into FY28E.
Promoters and management
- Surenderpal Singh Saluja, Chairman, is a promoter and has been with the company since incorporation. A mechanical engineer by training, he received a national award for entrepreneurship in micro and small enterprises in 2007.
- Chiranjeev Singh Saluja, Managing Director, has been with the business since 1997 and serves as a director of the All-India Solar Industries Association. The promoter family has therefore run this company through three technology cycles and two demand downturns.
- The senior team has been strengthened for the scale-up. The group chief financial officer, a chartered accountant, joined in 2023. The chief production officer, who sets up the cell and module lines, came from other Indian cell manufacturers. The chief business officer founded a solar advisory platform.
- Promoters held 58.5% at the end of Q1 FY27, with domestic institutions at 18.0% and foreign institutions at 8.5%.
Four Reasons We Own This One
The industry case is clear. This section is about why Premier is the way to express it.
Pillar 1 · Premier sits directly at India's cell bottleneck
India needs domestic cells and does not have enough of them. Operating supply is scarce, and it stays scarce because cell lines are technically demanding to stabilise and expensive to build. What matters is not how much capacity has been announced but how much is actually producing, and on that measure the field is thin.
Roughly 110 GW of cell capacity has been announced across the industry, while about 30 GW is approved and operating under ALMM today. Premier already operates 3.6 GW of that and held it at 92% utilisation in Q1 FY27, the highest in the industry. Two of the largest announced programmes are from groups that do not yet have a cell line in operation. Premier is not entering this business; it is scaling a capability it has already proved.
Premier covers about two-thirds of its panel capacity with its own cells today, against roughly a quarter at the larger listed peer. Once announced plans are complete that reaches about 95% for Premier and around 58% for the nearest comparable company. Every point of that gap is a cell a competitor buys at a scarce-market price while Premier makes its own.
Pillar 2 · From module assembler to vertically integrated manufacturer
The earnings transformation here is not about adding more panel capacity. Panel capacity is finished at 11.1 GW and does not grow again in our forecast. The change is that the economics of the cell move inside Premier's own manufacturing system, so a margin that used to be paid away to a supplier is retained.
Panel capacity does not move here; only the cell side does. That converts a cost previously paid to an outside supplier into margin retained inside the business. It is why revenue and profit step up together rather than revenue alone, and why the earnings change is larger than the revenue change.
Capacity coverage and actual usage are different things. Some capacity is lost converting cells into panels, the new plant only exists for part of FY27E, and around half the cell output is sold to other panel makers. On the measure that drives profit, panels built with own cells go from 37% in FY26 to about 74% in FY28E. Each such panel earns roughly ₹1.41 per watt more than one built on a bought-in cell.
Two of these four lines only exist once the new plant runs. The one to watch is not the largest. While domestic cells are scarce, a cell fetches around ₹12.00 per watt on the open market. That is more than it is worth to Premier as a saving on a bought-in cell. That is why management plans to place roughly half the output externally, and why this smallest line carries the widest margin.
Pillar 3 · Vertical integration provides margin resilience
The argument here is not that margins expand. It is that volumes scale materially while integration lets Premier defend an attractive margin as product prices normalise. We assume the price of a cell falls from 12.5 to 11.0 US cents per watt across the forecast, and the margin still holds.
The mechanism is straightforward. Take a panel selling at ₹16.70 per watt. The bought-in cell costs about ₹8.91, and glass, frame, backing sheet, wiring and assembly another ₹3.75. That leaves ₹4.04 per watt, or 24.2%. We model that line at 24.0%. If Premier makes the cell itself for about ₹7.50 instead of buying one, it keeps another ₹1.41 per watt. Making the cell in-house also removes the customs duty paid on an imported one and takes supplier pricing out of the equation.
- Q1 FY27 margin was 29.0%, down 1.1 points from 30.1% a year earlier, absorbing higher silver, copper and freight costs without breaching guidance.
- Management has committed to 29% to 30% for the next two to three years. Our FY27E estimate of 28.6% sits just below that, and FY28E at 29.2% sits inside it.
- The order book carries similar margins to current deliveries, so the near-term margin is contracted rather than assumed.
Pillar 4 · The growth is contracted, not hoped for
Revenue rises from ₹7,824 crore in FY26 to ₹16,118 crore in FY28E, and roughly 40% to 45% of a ₹15,000 crore order book is already scheduled into FY28E. The capacity is built, the rule is in force, and the customers have signed. What remains is execution on the commissioning timetable, which is set out in section 05.
Wafers, Transformers and Storage
What comes after FY28E, and how much of it is actually in our numbers.
Wafers · further backward integration
Embedded in our estimatesA wafer is the slice of silicon a cell is printed on, and India imports nearly all of them. Premier is building 10 GW of ingot and wafer capacity at Naidupeta, in two phases of 5 GW, the first due December 2027 and the second December 2028. Completing it removes the last imported input in the chain and takes Premier from cell-and-module to wafer-to-module.
Strategically this is the most important of the three, because it addresses the one remaining dependency. It is also the most technically demanding and carries the longest timeline. Only the first 5 GW phase sits in our FY28E numbers, and it contributes almost nothing to that year's profit.
Transformers · adjacent power infrastructure
Embedded in our estimatesThrough a 51% holding in Transcon-Neotrafo, Premier sells transformers to broadly the same customers who buy its panels. A 10 GVA high-voltage plant reached commercial operation in September 2026, taking capacity from about 4 GVA towards 16.25 GVA by FY28E. Management guides margins above 15% at the EBITDA level, below the panel business but on a different demand cycle. The 49% it does not own is deducted from the profit figures throughout this report.
Battery storage · emerging optionality
Upside not in our estimatesPremier is building a 12 GWh battery assembly facility, with 6 GWh under construction. Land is secured and a technology partner is being finalised. Storage is the natural companion product to solar and the customer list overlaps almost entirely. Government rules on imported components are still being settled, so we have kept this deliberately small in our forecast. If it scales as planned, it is upside to our numbers rather than part of them.
Inverters and frames · smaller adjacencies
Upside not in our estimatesA 51% stake in KSolare brings residential inverter manufacturing, with capacity expanding from 500,000 units a year. A separate 80%-owned aluminium frame venture is targeting 36,000 tonnes a year, with the first 18,000 tonne phase due March 2027. Management believes making frames in-house could add 100 to 150 basis points to group margin. Neither is material in our estimates.
Management has said it wants the newer businesses to reach about 30% of group revenue over time. Our FY28E numbers carry roughly 8%. We have deliberately not stacked every announcement into the forecast or the target price. Wafers and transformers are embedded because they are funded, under construction and dated. Storage, inverters and frames are real but early, and we would rather they arrive as upside than build a target on them.
Paying for the Expansion
What is being built, what it costs, where the money comes from, and what the balance sheet looks like at the worst point.
| Capital spending (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cell expansion, Naidupeta | 1,500 | 3,000 | 1,200 |
| Panel expansion, Seetharampur | 900 | 300 | 300 |
| Ingot and wafer | 200 | 1,000 | 1,500 |
| Storage, frames and inverters | 300 | 600 | 800 |
| Maintenance and other | 98 | 200 | 200 |
| Programme capital spending | 2,998 | 5,100 | 4,000 |
| Interest capitalised during construction | – | 44 | 82 |
| Total shown in cash flow | 2,998 | 5,144 | 4,082 |
The FY27E figure of ₹5,100 crore is management guidance, of which ₹1,500 crore was already spent in Q1 FY27. Across FY27E and FY28E the programme absorbs ₹9,100 crore, equal to about 41% of FY27E revenue.
How it is paid for
| Sources and uses (₹ Cr) | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|
| Opening cash | 1,466 | 565 |
| Cash generated from operations | 2,113 | 3,420 |
| Net new borrowing | 2,500 | 1,275 |
| Equity raised | 0 | 0 |
| Capital spending | (5,144) | (4,082) |
| Interest paid | (296) | (434) |
| Dividends and other | (74) | (91) |
| Closing cash | 565 | 652 |
- Operating cash flow covers roughly 40% of FY27E spending on its own and rises to ₹3,420 crore in FY28E as the new capacity earns.
- The balance is bank debt. Net debt peaks at ₹5,803 crore in FY28E, and net debt to EBITDA peaks earlier at 1.3x in FY27E, inside the 1.5x ceiling management has set for itself.
- Interest is covered more than 8 times by operating profit at the tightest point, so servicing the debt is not in question.
- Deleveraging begins in FY29E, when the heavy spending ends, free cash flow turns positive and the ratio falls back towards 0.8x.
- Closing cash of ₹652 crore in FY28E sits above the roughly ₹500 crore the business needs to operate comfortably, but the buffer in that one year is thin.
The board has approved an enabling resolution to raise up to ₹5,000 crore through a qualified institutional placement or other routes, put to shareholders at the AGM on 21 September 2026. Management has described it as precautionary cover for a fast-growing business, said there is no concrete near-term plan to use it, and noted that resolutions of this kind are taken every year. We have not included any raise in our forecast. If one happens, the FY28E funding question disappears and the per-share figures in this report change with the larger share count.
Financial Summary
FY25 and FY26 are reported. FY27E and FY28E are our estimates, built from the commissioning schedule upwards.
| Profit and loss (₹ Cr) | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 6,519 | 7,824 | 12,406 | 16,118 |
| Growth | +107% | +20% | +59% | +30% |
| EBITDA | 1,781 | 2,377 | 3,547 | 4,700 |
| EBITDA margin | 27.3% | 30.4% | 28.6% | 29.2% |
| Depreciation | 498 | 453 | 715 | 1,115 |
| Finance cost | 177 | 158 | 296 | 434 |
| PAT | 938 | 1,510 | 2,042 | 2,519 |
| EPS (₹) | 21.35 | 33.63 | 44.99 | 55.50 |
Balance sheet
| ₹ Cr | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net fixed assets and work in progress | 1,155 | 3,796 | 8,240 | 11,222 |
| Inventories | 1,326 | 2,037 | 3,032 | 3,746 |
| Trade receivables | 801 | 983 | 1,563 | 2,031 |
| Cash and liquid investments | 2,838 | 2,493 | 1,592 | 1,679 |
| Total assets | 6,841 | 10,845 | 15,967 | 20,227 |
| Net worth | 2,822 | 4,310 | 6,331 | 8,825 |
| Gross debt including leases | 1,954 | 3,707 | 6,207 | 7,482 |
| Net debt | (885) | 1,214 | 4,616 | 5,803 |
| Book value per share (₹) | 62.6 | 95.1 | 138.5 | 192.4 |
Cash flow and returns
| ₹ Cr | FY25 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash generated from operations | 1,348 | 1,261 | 2,113 | 3,420 |
| Capital spending | (2,410) | (2,998) | (5,144) | (4,082) |
| Free cash flow | (1,062) | (1,737) | (3,031) | (662) |
| Closing cash | 803 | 1,466 | 565 | 652 |
| RoE | 54.1% | 42.3% | 38.4% | 33.2% |
| RoCE | 37.6% | 30.1% | 27.6% | 24.9% |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | net cash | 0.5x | 1.3x | 1.2x |
| Working capital cycle (days) | 78 | 115 | 114 | 108 |
Returns fall and that needs explaining. RoCE goes from 30.1% to 24.9% not because the business deteriorates but because capital employed nearly doubles while Naidupeta and Seetharampur are still filling. The numerator grows in every year; the denominator simply grows faster for two of them, and the position reverses once the plants run at rate.
Have a question on any number in these tables?Ask our research desk about a specific assumption, from cell prices to capital spending to working capital.Talk to our research deskThe Numbers in Pictures
Four charts, each answering a question an investor would ask of the tables above.
What Could Go Wrong
- Execution risk. The 7 GW cell plant, the 10 GW wafer facility, the transformer expansion and the storage line are all being built at once. The wafer plant is the most technically demanding and carries the longest timeline. A slip at Naidupeta shifts revenue between years rather than removing it, but a slip at the wafer plant delays the point at which Premier is fully independent of imported inputs.
- Industry risk. About 110 GW of cell capacity has been announced against roughly 30 GW approved and operating today. If that supply arrives faster than the market expects, the scarcity that supports today's cell pricing eases, and share prices across the sector would likely fall with it.
- Pricing risk. We assume the realisation on a cell falls from 12.5 to 11.0 US cents per watt by FY29E and that panel prices ease alongside. A faster decline would compress the merchant cell line, cushioned only partly by more output going into Premier's own panels.
- Policy risk. The case rests on the requirement to use Indian-made cells staying in place. Policy has moved consistently towards more local content, not less, and the deferral granted earlier this year covered only a small part of the market. A material relaxation, or duty relief on imported cells, would change the argument.
- Balance sheet risk. Net debt peaks at 1.3x EBITDA in FY27E and FY28E closes with a cash buffer of about ₹150 crore above the operating minimum. A capital overrun or a working capital shock in that single year leaves limited room before the fundraising resolution would need to be used.
- Technology risk. Cell technology moves. Premier's newer capacity is TOPCon, the current generation, and management has flagged interest in the next steps beyond it. Older mono PERC capacity carries the risk of being competed down as the industry standard shifts.
Growth Brings Premier Into an Attractive Forward Band
We value Premier at 13x FY28E EV/EBITDA, the first full year with the new cell plant running, giving a target of ₹1,273 a share.
| At the current price of ₹1,005 | FY26 | FY27E | FY28E |
|---|---|---|---|
| EV/EBITDA | 18x | 13x | 10x |
| P/E | 30x | 22x | 18x |
| P/B | 10.6x | 7.3x | 5.2x |
| EPS (₹) | 33.63 | 44.99 | 55.50 |
| Book value per share (₹) | 95.1 | 138.5 | 192.4 |
| RoE | 42.3% | 38.4% | 33.2% |
| RoCE | 30.1% | 27.6% | 24.9% |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | 0.5x | 1.3x | 1.2x |
Premier trades at approximately 18x FY28E P/E and 10x FY28E EV/EBITDA, in the middle of a large earnings-growth cycle. Cell integration is approaching maturity, and the wafer, transformer and storage businesses are still ahead of it. On our numbers EBITDA compounds at about 41% a year between FY26 and FY28E. The company still earns a 33% return on equity at the end of a period in which it has roughly doubled its capital base.
That is broadly in line with the listed solar manufacturing peer set, which trades around 10x forward EBITDA, and we do not think the two should be priced the same. Premier has the highest cell-to-panel integration in the sector. It has shown it can run these lines, at 92% cell utilisation, while several peers are still stabilising their first ones. Its order book already covers a large part of FY28E. A 15% to 25% quality premium on the peer median implies 11.8x to 12.8x. We apply 13x, one notch above that band, and the extra notch reflects the scarcity window rather than anything in the forecast.
Recommendation
We initiate coverage on Premier Energies with a BUY rating and a 12-month target price of ₹1,273. The downside looks contained. Even at 12x a profit figure 5% below our forecast, the value comes out about 10% above the current price. The company also funds the entire programme without asking shareholders for money. We would revisit the multiple if the domestic cell premium compressed below about 40%, and the estimates if Q2 FY27 showed the panel line filling more slowly than assumed.
Want to understand how we arrived at ₹1,273?Our research desk can take you through the multiple, the peer set and what would make us change it.Talk to our research deskRecommendation history
Aug-26
Premier Energies LTD (NSE: PREMIERENE) Price History
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Report history
11 Nov 2026
Q2 FY27 Update - Integration Protects The Margin As Cell Prices Ease, And The New Plant Carries Growth Into FY28.
Buy↑ 45%
26 Aug 2026This report
The Domestic Cell Behind India's Solar Build-Out
Buy · Initiating↑ 27%
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Disclosures
This report is issued by Front Wave Research LLP, a SEBI-registered Research Analyst (Reg. INH000018407). Type of registration: Non-Individual. Calls and upside or downside are as at the publication date, not live. Investment in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing. Registration granted by SEBI, enlistment of RA with Exchange and certification from NISM in no way guarantee performance of the intermediary or provide any assurance of returns to investors. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investors must perform their own due diligence before acting on any recommendations. Read the full disclosures here.
